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AIDS INFECTS THE CANADIAN LEGAL COMMUNITY- CANADA'S
INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF COMMON LAW CRIMINALIZING
CARRIERS
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the World Health Orgaization (WHO), Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)1 has infected up to seventeen
million people, three-quarters of them m the developing world.
2
The WHO estimates that HIV will infect forty million people by
the end of the decade? In light of this serious epidemic, it is
understandable why many citizens look to their government for
protection.4 Canada, the United States, England, and Australia
are examples of countries that have debated whether cnrmnalizmg
the transfer of the virus will hinder its spread.5
As a result of countries' reactions to the virus and the disease,
the battle against Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
has spread from hospitals and laboratories into the courtrooms of
the world. Recently, courts have experienced an influx of cases
where a person afflicted with HIV has intentionally, or recklessly,
exposed others to the virus.
6
Different countries' legal systems deal with the transmission of
HIV in different ways.7 Although most countries have experi-
enced cases involving the intentional spread of HIV, controversy
1. HIV is the virus that causes Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).
AIDS PROJECT Los ANGELES, AIDS: A SELF-CARE MANUAL (2d ed. 1993).
2. Full-Blown AIDS Cases Estimated at 4 million, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1994, at 8.
3. Juliet O'Neil, Improved Co-ordination Needed in Global Fight Against AIDS, PM
Says, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Dec. 2, 1994, at 8.
4. Be Tough on Those Who Spread AIDS, MONTREAL GAZETE, Aug. 19, 1993, at
B2 [hereinafter Tough on AIDS]; Tom Blackwell, Law Outlawing Deliberate Spread of
AIDS Virus is Studied, MONTREAL GAZETTE, May 19, 1993, at Bi; Spreading of AIDS
Crimma Doctor Says, VANCOUVER SUN, June 9, 1994, at B16 [hereinafter Spreading
AIDS Criminal]; David Storey, Britain Ponders How to Stop Wilful AIDS Infection, Reuter
Library Report, June 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, NON-US File; Debbie
Salamone, Exposing Someone to AIDS-Is that a Crime?, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., May
12, 1992, at Al; Peter Mosley, Worldwide Dilemma Should AIDS be a Crime?, Reuter
Library Report, June 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, NON-US File.
5. Salamone, supra note 4, at Al; Mosley, supra note 4.
6. Robert Bragg, AIDS is Out There Just Waiting, CALGARY HERALD, Nov. 24, 1993,
at A4; HIV and the Code, WINDSOR STAR, May 31, 1993, at A6; Salamone, supra note 4,
at Al.
7. Mosley, supra note 4.
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remains about whether these cases are common enough to
criminalize the behavior, thereby stigmatizing the HIV carrier even
further.'
After a few high-profile cases m which a defendant intentional-
ly threatened, or actually infected, others with HIV, Canadians
began crticlzmg their legal system for not protecting the public
-from AIDS.9 The Canadian Parliament, however, has not enacted
legislation to outlaw the transfer of HIV On the other hand,
some Canadian courts have taken a strict stand against those who
threaten others with HIV"
U.S. citizens have similarly demanded protection from their
government.12 U.S. state and federal courts, however, are not as
willing as Canadian courts to crimmalize the intentional spread of
the virus without any truly applicable precedent.1 3 The courts'
,silence on the issue forced state legislatures to draft laws that
crimmalize the intentional or reckless transfer of the virus."
Some Canadian commentators argue that the Parliament
should draft legislation comparable to statutes found in many U.S.
states. 5 Because Canadian statutory law does not address the
transfer of HIV, and the threat of the virus is so recent that
common law precedent is mimmal, 6 Canadian law is very unsta-
ble when addressing tis issue. In fact, the area is so legally
tenuous that Canadian judges continuously disregard the few recent
cases that do address the cnmmalization of the transfer of HIV,
8. Storey, supra note 4; Salamone, supra note 4, at Al.
9: Blackwell, supra note 4, at Bi; Tough on AIDS, supra note 4, at B2.
10. Top Court Upholds AIDS Ruling, CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 4, 1994, at A14
[hereinafter Top Court).
11. Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530, 530 (1993) (Can.); Regina v. Mercer, 84
C.C.C.3d 41, 65 (Nfld. Ct. App. 1993); Regina v. Ssenyonga, 73 C.C.C.3d 216, 221 (Ont.
Prov. Div. 1992).
12. Salamone, supra note 4, at Al; Curtis Krueger, Look at What Lawmakers are
Doing for Us, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 6, 1994; at 60; T.J. Milling, Texas AIDS Law
Off Books in 1994, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 5, 1993, at Ci.
13. Krueger, supra note 12, at 60; Milling, supra note 12, at Cl.
14. Krueger, supra note 12, at 60; Milling, supra note 12, at Cl; see, e.g., ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie 1994); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1621.5 (West 1995); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 775.0877 (West 1995).
15. HIV and the.Code, supra note 6, at A6; Blackwell, supra note 4, at B1.
16. Top Court, supra note 10, at.A14; see also Regina v. Ssenyonga, 81 C.C.C.3d 257,
266 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1993); Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530,533 (1993) (Can.), Regina
v. Mercer, 84 C.C.C.3d 41, 49 (Nfld. Ct. App. 1993).
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and instead develop their own legal analysis.17
The Canadian Parliament may have the same fears- that
originally hindered the U.S. legal community from expanding the
common law to include transmission of HIV as a crime. In the
mid-eighties, most U.S. county district attorneys and state courts
were wary of crimunalizing the spread of HIV because of the
possible infringement on the personal liberties of HIV-infected
citizens.' For the same reason, state legislatures were slow to
pass laws that dealt directly with the intentional or reckless
transmission of the virus. Although many vocal constituents feared
that the stigma of HIV would increase if intentional transmission
was criminalized, a greater constituency of U.S. citizens demanded
such legislation from their state governments. 19
Without legislation, U.S. state courts were hesitant to use
common law, as Canada does, to convict a defendant for transnut-
ting HIV2' Utilizing common law to crimmalize the transfer of
HIV has resulted in inconsistent prosecution of similar conduct in
Canada.21 This inconsistency also could become prevalent in a
U.S. state if its government criminally prosecutes the persons who
transfer the virus without a criminal statute that specifically
addresses the issue.
Acknowledging inconsistency as a possible problem, twenty-
four U.S. states have enacted laws crimmalizing the intentional
transfer of HIV' As a result, prosecutors more freely charge
defendants with the crime of transmitting HIV, or elevate
traditional assault or rape charges to attempted murder if the
defendant knew he was putting the victim at risk of contracting the
virus.
23
17. Top Court, supra note 10, at A14; see also Regina v. Ssenyonga 81 C.C.C.3d 257,
266 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1993); Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530,533 (1993) (Can.); Regina
v. Mercer, 84 C.C.C.3d 41, 49 (Nfld. Ct. App. 1993).
18. Mike McKee, Violators Face Court-Martial; G.L's with AIDS Forced to Tell
Partners and Others, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 16, 1992, at 2; Salamone, supra note 4, at Al.
19. McKee, supra note 18, at 2; Salamone, supra note 4, at Al.
20. See, eg., Barlow v. Superior Court, 236 Cal. Rptr. 134, 140 (Ct. App.), review
denied and opinion ordered depublished, May 26, 1987.
21. See Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530, 540 (1993) (Can.); Regina v. Mercer, 84
C.C.C.3d 41, 55 (Nfld. Ct. App. 1993); Regina.v. Ssenyonga, 81 C.C.C.3d 257, 266 (Ont.
Gen. Div. 1993); Regina v. Ssenyonga, 73 C.C.C.3d 216, 224 (Ont. Prov. Div. 1992).
22. Blackwell, supra note 4, at B1; Milling, supra note 12, at Ci.
23. Salamone, supra note 4, at Al; Milling, supra note 12, at Cl; Josh Meyer, Women
Fear Rape Suspect May Have Given Them HIV,L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1994, at Ai.
403
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
Tis Note addresses several issues regarding crnunalizing the
transfer of HIV Part II discusses how various countries have dealt
with the outbreak. Part II also examines the arguments in favor of
and against crimmalization, focusing on the strategies of Canada
and the United States. Part III gives an overview of the principal
Canadian cases that have addressed the issue, and illustrates how
Canada's exclusive common law interpretations have resulted in an
inconsistent body of law. Part III also analyzes -the principal
Canadian cases to determine how different courts built upon
traditional criminal law to amve at verdicts. - Part IV considers
U.S. state statutes that have outlawed the intentional transfer of
HIV as models for possible Canadian legislation. Part V examines
the drawbacks of codified crimunalization of transmitting HIV
Part VI concludes that Canada needs to enact legislation address-
ing the intentional transfer of HIV if it is to better ensure justice.
II.. STRATEGIES WORLDWIDE TO COMBAT HIV
AIDS in the courtroom is a very new phenomenon to the
world, and legal precedent is scarce. It is only now that legislation
and legal battles are establishing precedent to deal with this issue.
Jim Kellog, legal director of the Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, stated that this precedent-setting power can be
dangerous to AIDS victims.24 The opinons of only a few law-
makers and law-interpreters are forming policies in an area that
cannot be clearly defined in the law because it is not even clearly
defined in the medical community.-5 As a result, the present
political climate of the country in wich the transmission occurs
determines the treatment of the HIV-carrer in .the courtroom.
Several countries exhibit a growing intolerance of those who
spread the HIV virus. Unfortunately, a country's dramatic reaction
to a new problem can result in a confusing body of law. Although
Canada's use of common law to deal with this issue is umque,
Canada's inconsistent law is not necessarily unusual in comparison
to other countries. In the Umted States, for example, the federal
government has left crinalization of the spread of HIV to the
states, which has resulted in a variety of statutory positions across
24. Susan T. Martin, The AIDS Battle Moves to the Legal Front, ST: PETERSBURG
TIMES, July 13, 1987, at 1A. The Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund is the oldest
and largest gay legal aid groupin the United States. Seeud.
25. Id.
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the fifty states; moreover, these laws differ from city to city within
the same state.26 Australia's six states and two territories also
have different laws dealing with those who are HIV-positive. Some
Australian states have no relevant statute, some have statutes that
provide for fines and imprisonment for carmers who knowingly
expose others to HIV, and a couple go so far as to crlimnalize the
transfer of any sexually-transmitted disease.27
Inconsistency in Canada and the Umted States is due in large
part to the concern for personal liberty. If personal liberty was less
of a concern to the government, courts and legislatures could
automatically jail anyone who transferred the virus and thereby
simplify the regulation of the crime. For example, Sweden has no
special AIDS legislation, but it does have a 1989 law covenng all
"illnesses dangerous to society."' Sweden compels anyone
proven to have deliberately infected another with HIV to undergo
six months of isolation m a hospital.29 Countries need to evaluate
whether alleviating the threat of AIDS is worth infringing upon
their citizens' freedom.
In the other corner, there are countries with serious AIDS
problems that do not use the law as a panacea to the epidemic. In
1992, the British Parliament ruled out legal measures to stop
people with the HIV virus from having unprotected sex after the
British Health Secretary warned the Parliament that a tough legal
approach to the problem could drive those who are HIV-positive
underground." Similarly, Thailand's approach to fighting AIDS
focuses on educating the country's tens of thousands of prostitutes
and their customers, rather than on legal constraints.31
Supporters and critics debate the issue of whether
governments should crminalize the transfer of HIV Whichever
policy the country or state promotes, governments need to
implement a policy that applies uniformly to ensure justice.
Without statutes that address HIV or AIDS, or case law for courts
to follow, authorities are likely to charge a defendant with an ill-
26. Salamone, supra note 4, at Al; see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie
1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.0877 (West 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60 (1995); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2 (Smith-Hurd 1995).
27. Mosley, supra note 4; Blackwell, supra note 4, at B1.
28. Mosley, supra note 4.
29. Mosley, supra note 4; Blackwell, supra note 4, at B1.
30. Mosley, supra note 4; Blackwell, supra note 4, at B1.
31. Mosley, supra note 4; Blackwell, supra note 4, at B1.
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defined crime, and thereby implement a random judicial process.
III. THE CANADIAN STRATEGY
Canada's strategy to hinder the spread of HIV is unique.
Canada is the only western country that impnsons those found
guilty of spreading HIV without any laws on its books specifically
addressing the issue.32 Members of Canada's courts apparently
have taken it upon themselves to act as public health officials
regarding the spread of the virus.
There are no statutes on point, but several Canadian judges
have interpreted some very general, and traditional, crmunal laws
to encompass, and therefore criminalize, the transfer of HIV
These laws predate the "AIDS scare," so the writers of these laws
could not have had HIV in mind when they drafted the laws.
33
Instead, Canadian courts rationalize that the carriers of HIV are
such a threat to the public health that the courts must take a stand
if the legislature will not do so.'
Using a strictly common-law-developed approach to the HIV
problem opens the door to inconsistent application of the law. It
is unclear how Canadian courts will rule on the next case that deals
with the intentional or reckless transfer of HIV because different
courts have used different rationales to criminalize the transfer of
the virus.35 Each judge is quick to, distinguish the holdings of
higher courts and completely ignore the holdings of other junsdic-
tions.
36
A. Overview of Canadian Cases
There are four principal Canadian cases that address the
32. Mosley, supra note 4.
33. See, e.g., Crimnal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 180, 221, 271 (1985) (Can.).
34. See generally Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530 (1993) (Can.); Regina v. Mercer,
84 C.C.C.3d 41 (Nfld. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that judges may interpret tangential criminal
statutes to convict defendants for their abhorrent conduct even though there are no
Canadian statutes that directly outlaw the conduct).
35. Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530, 532 (1993) (Can.); Regina v. Cuerier, 26
W.C.B.2d 378, 378 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1995); Regina v. Mercer, 84 C.C.C.3d 41, 55 (Nfld. Ct.
App. 1993).
36. Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530,.532 (1993) (Can.); Regina v. Cuemer, 26
W.C.B.2d 378, 378 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1995); Regina v. Mercer, 84 C.C.C.3d 41, 55 (Nfld. Ct.
App. 1993); Regina v. Ssenyonga, 81 C.C.C.3d 257, 266 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1993).
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intentional transfer of'HV 37 Due to the significantly different
results and manners of analysis applied in each case, there is little
consistent precedent. The public expected Regina v. Ssenyonga8
to establish a much needed precedent.39 This case represented
the first time m Canada that a person accused of knowingly
spreading HIV went to full trial.40 Canadian authorities charged
Charles Ssenyonga with public nuisance, three counts of aggravated
assault and three counts of criminal negligence.41 The judge
threw out the public nuisance charge at the preliminary hearing
because he determined that Ssenyonga had not endangered the
public at large.42 Then, after holding that the transfer of HIV
does not vitiate consent, a judge in the Ontario Court General
Division acquitted Ssenyonga of the aggravated assault charges.43
The victim's consent to sexual relations with the defendant,
whether she was aware of the defendant's disease or not, was not
vitiated by her exposure to HIV44 Moreover, the court held that
the sexual assault section of the Criminal Code was not designed
to deal with cases of "ordinary" sexual relations.45
There had never been a judicial decision, however, regarding
the charge of criminal negligence.46 Two weeks before an Ontario
Court of Appeal judge was to decide the criminal negligence
charges, Ssenyonga died of complications associated with AIDS.4
The judge refused to make a ruling only to establish precedent, and
the provincial Crown would not appeal without a defendant.48
In Regina v. Thornton,49 the court reached a decision,
although it applied a very different analysis than the Ontario courts
37. Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530, 532 (1993) (Can.); Regina v. Cuemer, 26
W.C.B.2d 378, 378 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1995); Regina v. Mercer, 84 C.C.C.3d 41, 55 (Nfld. Ct.
App. 1993); Regina v. Ssenyonga, 81 C.C.C.3d 257, 266 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1993).
38. Regina v. Ssenyonga, 81 C.C.C.3d 257, 266 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1993).
39. Joe Ruscitti, Province Rejects Appeal ofAIDS Case, WINDSOR STAR, Jan. 17,1994,
at A10.
40. Id.
41. Regina v. Ssenyonga, 73 C.C.C.3d 216, 217 (Ont. Proy. Div. 1992).
42. Id. at 224.
43. Regina v. Ssenyonga, 81 C.C.C.3d 257 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1993).
44. Id. at 266.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Lawrence Greenspon, Justice is Not Served by Trying a Corpse, VANCOUVER SUN,
Aug. 18, 1993, at A14; Ruscitti, supra note 39, at A10.
48. Greenspon, supra note 47, at A14; Ruscitti, supra note 39, at A10.
49. Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530, 530 (1993) (Can.).
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in the Ssenyonga case. In Thornton, different statutes and facts
were at issue. First, the defendant's alleged "crime" was donating
blood while he was infected with HIV Second, the defendant
never actually transferred HIV because the blood bank found the
virus before it distributed the blood to the public.51 Third, the
court convicted the defendant of a common nuisance.52
The Thornton court ignored the issue of consent that was at
the heart of the Ssenyonga court's analysis5 3 Tius disregard of
the consent issue most likely was intended to avoid deciding
whether a health care worker consents to possible exposure to HIV
by taking the job. Instead, the Thornton court held that the
donation of blood infected with HIV, not the transfer of the virus
to another party, is the "unlawful act" under common law and
therefore subject to criminal penalty.'
Thornton was helpful, however, in addressing the legitimacy of
using tangential common law when there exists no statute that
directly crinmmalizes a defendant's conduct.' In Ssenyonga, the
judge did not explain why he freely used common law. The judge
focused more on the public policy behind a need for his decision,
rather than on the right of the court to make such a decision.-6
In the third case, Regina v. Mercer, the Newfoundland Court
of Appeal emphasized the seriousness of the intentional spread of
HIV to justify increasing the sentence of a defendant who pleaded.
guilty to criminal negligenceY Although the court had already
convicted the defendant of intentionally exposing others to -IIV
based on his plea, it conducted a lengthy analysis of the legitimacy
behind using criminal negligence to outlaw this behavior.58
The court convicted Mercer of criminal negligence because of
his reckless conduct that led to his transfer of the virus5 9 The
court would not apply the crime of common nuisance to the
defendant's conduct because it was unwilling to crimunalize the
50. Id. at 532.
51. i.
52. i.
53. See d. at 530; see, e.g., Regina v. Ssenyonga, 81 C.C.C.3d 257 (Ont. Gen. Div.
1993).
54. Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530, 533 (1993) (Can.).
55. Id. at 533-35.
56. Regina v. Ssenyonga, 81 C.C.C.3d 257, 265-66 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1993).
57. Regina v. Mercer, 84 C.C.C.3d 41, 54-58 (Nfld. Ct. App. 1993).
58. Id.
59. Id at 42.
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transfer of HIV6 This rationale is m direct contrast to the
holding m. Thornton, where even the mere threat of transfer was
crinmmalized.6'
In the most recent case to deal with this situation, Regina v.
Cuerner,62 the Crown again tried to convict a defendant for
criminal assault based on the defendant's consensual sexual activity.
As in Ssenyonga, the court found that the defendant was not guilty
of aggravated sexual assault even though he lied to his partner
about Ins HIV status.63  In Cuemer, the British Columbia
Supreme Court held that Cuerner's HIV status is irrelevant to the
issue of consent."
In all four cases, the courts acknowledged the inexcusable
behavior of the defendants.6 Yet, because of the ill-defined
nature of the law, the courts only convicted one of the three
defendants who engaged in sexual relations while knowingly
carrying the virus.6 6  Furthermore, a court convicted Thornton,
who donated blood without transmitting the virus, even though the
Canadian public would probably find his behavior to be less
egregious than that of Ssenyonga or Cuerner.
The problem is that without consistent precedent, the courts
use different statutory "crimes" or common law precedent to
crtminalize the conduct. There are three consequences to this
inconsistency. First, some judges are unwilling to convict a
defendant, who obviously has committed a wrong, because there is
no statute or common law precedent that truly addresses the
situation.67 Second, some judges are more likely to convict on the
60. Id.
61. Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530, 533-35 (1993) (Can.).
62. Regina v. Cuerrier, 26 W.C.B.2d 378, 378 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1995).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Regina v. Mercer, 84 C.C.C.3d 41, 64 (Nfld. Ct. App. 1993) (describing the
defendant's conduct "atrocious"); Regina v. Ssenyonga, 81 C.C.C.3d 257, 266 (Oat. Gen.
Div. 1993) (stating that people should not be permitted to hide their HIV status from their
sex partners and if the Criminal Code fails to punish such conduct, then Parliament should
pass new legislation); Regina v. Cuerrier, 26 W.C.B.2d 378, 378 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1995)
(predicting that "many will undoubtedly find the actions of the accused in this case
repugnant and deserving of punishment," before acquitting the defendant because of lack
'of applicable law); Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530, 540 (1993) (Can.) (categormng
the defendant's conduct as "among the worst offenses" and "verg[ing] on the unspeak-
able").
66. Mercer, 84 C.C.C.3d at 41.
67. Cuerrier, 26 W.C.B.2d at 378.
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basis of their "personal" views than on the egregiousness of the
defendant's conduct, resulting m inconsistent convictions. Third,
the confusion dilutes one of the main purposes of the judicial
system-deterrence. Threat of prosecution is unlikely to deter the
public if the elements of the crime are so loosely defined. Thus, it
is not clear when Canada will label the intentional or reckless
exposure of HIV as "crimnal."
B. A History of Canadian Common Law Interpretations of HIV
I Transmission
In January 1991, a Canadian court, for the first, time, officially
considered the HIV-positive status of a defendant.8 The defen-
dant pleaded guilty to the crime of sexual assault on an eight-year-
old boy. Although the boy had not contracted HIV at the time of
trial, the judge considered the HIV-positive status of the defendant
as a serious factor when he sentenced the defendant.69 The
British Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the maximum penalty
of ten years imprisonment for sexual offenses against children,
based on the nature of the crimes, their frequency, the use of
videotaping the victim and the fact that the defendant was aware
of his HIV status while he committed the crimes.7"
Sigmficantly, Cormier's risky conduct, rather than the resulting
transmission of HI, aggravated his sentence.71 The defendant m
Thornton, one of the few defendants in the HIV cases to be
convicted of a crime for carrying on normal activity while HIV-
positive, was convicted for the risky conduct of donating "tainted"
blood." There was no transmission of HIV as a result of his
conduct, however, because nobody distributed the blood to the
public. The Mercer court was also unwilling to crmuialize the
actual transfer of the virus. It was the defendant's engagement in
sexual relations with women without telling them about his known
HIV status that the court considered to be crminally negligent.73
68. Regina v. Cormier, 12 W.C.B.2d 336 (B.C. Ct. App. 1991).
69. Id. at 337.
70. Id.
71. i
72. Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530, 539-40 (1993) (Can.).
73. Regina v. Mercer, 84 C.C.C3d 41, 42 (Nfld. Ct. App. 1993).
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1. Regina v. Ssenyonga
Canada has used various arguments to imprison or fine
people for transmitting HIV In Ssenyonga, the defendant engaged
in sexual intercourse with three women without using a condom
after he tested positive for H1V 74 The Crown tried to prosecute
the defendant under several theories: the defendant committed
three counts of sexual assault; three counts of administering a
noxious thing; and three counts of committing a common
nuisance.75 The Crown's arguments illustrate different views
regarding the blameworthiness of the carners of the virus.
a. The Effect of Consent in a Sexual Relationship
The count of sexual assault utilizes a traditional tort theory of
consent. In Ssenyonga, all three of the defendant's partners
willingly consented to sexual intercourse with the accused on every
occasion.76 All three women also were aware of the existence and
threat of AIDS while carrying on their relationships with the
defendant. Finally, all three women were infected with HIV7
The Crown tried to prove that all three partners were sexually
assaulted because the defendant's nondisclosure of his HIV status
invalidated their consent to sexual intercourse.7 The consent was
vitiated by fraud because the risk inherent in any sexual activity
with the defendant is so grave that it "lies outside of the ambit of
consent to sex per se."79  The issue is the scope of what an
individual consents to when he or she agrees to engage m sex with
a partner.
On the one hand, the spread of AIDS and other sexually
transmitted diseases is so widespread and publicized by the media
and the health community, one could assume that a person accepts
the risk of contracting a disease when he or she consents to sex.
In the cases this Note discusses, the women were all equal partners
in the relationship; therefore, they should take equal responsibility
for what happened.
74. Regina v. Ssenyonga, 81 C.C.C.3d 257, 258-59. (Ont. Gen. Div. 1993).
75. Id.
76. id.
77. Id. at 259.
78. Id. at 259-60.
79. Regina v. Ssenyonga, 81 C.C.C.3d 257, 259 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1993).
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The Crown argued, however, that consenting to sex does not
include "consent" to the risk of deadly results from the sexual
contact.8 ° Even if the community at large knows of the risk of
AIDS, public policy dictates that the consent should be vitiated
because the probability and immediacy of harm from unprotected
vaginal intercourse with an HIV-positive person is so serious.
81
Although the legal argument here is based primarily on public
policy, other areas of law endorse this argument. As an intentional
hit to the back of the neck might exceed the implied consent. to the
risk of injury in a hockey game,' the known presence of HIV is
so inherently dangerous that sex with someone who IS HIV-positive
extends beyond the norm of conduct that a person should expect
from partaking in the activity.8 3
The Canadian courts have not agreed with the Crown's
interpretation of "consent." Sexual relations, historically a private
matter, have been outted by the AIDS epidemic." As a result,
one can no longer separate the relationship itself from the risks
associated with it. The problem with this policy is that it in effect
"crimnalizes" those involved in sexual relationships. Instead of
deterring people with HLV from engaging in sex without first
telling their partner, the policy blames the partner for engaging in
the activity.
b. The Old View of Consent
Transmitting a venereal disease to another person was a
criminal offense in Canada until the Parliament repealed the 1985
Criminal Law Amendment Act!' English common law, often
used as precedent in Canadian courts, addresses vitiating consent
to sexual activity when dealing with venereal diseases.
8 6
80. Id.
81. Regina v. Lee, 3 O.R.3d 726, 728 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1991).
82. Regina v. Leclerc, 67 C.C.C.3d 563, 568-69 (Ont. Ct. App. 1991).
83. Terrah Keener, a representative of AIDS Vancouver, said that unless the defendant
committed rape, the prosecution of one of two consenting sexual partners raises questions
of dual responsibility. Spreading AIDS CrnaL supra note 4, at B16.
84. Kathleen Byrne, Victims of AIDS "Charmer" Live Without Justice, FIN. PoST, Apr.
22, 1995, at 28.
85. Criminal Law Amendment Act, S.C., ch. 19, § 42 (1985) (Can.).
86. Regina v. Vantandilo, 4 M. & S. 73 (1815) (Eng.); Regina v. Burnett, 4 M. & S.
272 (1815) (Eng.); Regina v. Bennett, 4 F & F 1105 (Assize) (1866) (Eng.); Regina v.
Sinclair, 13 Cox C.C.28 (C.C.C.) (1867) (Eng.); Regina v. Ssenyonga, 81 C.C.C.3d 257,259
(Ont. Gen. Div. 1993).
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In Ssenyonga, the Crown pointed out that the traditional rule
in England regarding venereal diseases is that if deception causes
a misunderstanding as to the nature of the act itself, there is no
legally recognized consent because the act was beyond the scope
of that to which the partner consented.87 If the deceit relates
merely to some collateral matter, rather than the act being done,
this consent induced by fraud is as effective as any other con-
sent.8
This interpretation of consent fell out of favor when Canadian
courts began to rule on the transmission of HV through sexual
relationships. In a 1991 case, Regina v. Lee, the defendant argued
that the fact that he was HIV-positive was collateral to the sexual
act because the complainants did not misunderstand the nature of
the act of unprotected sexual intercourse.89 A trial judge in the
General Division of Canada agreed with the defendant's argument,
and acquitted him.'' This was one of the first judges to hear, and
agree with, the argument that consent to sexual relations includes
consent to the risk of a sexually transmitted disease.9 Although
most Canadian courts did not rely on Lee as precedent,92 this
decision foreshadowed future higher courts' rulings regarding
consent to sexual relationships.
The lower court judge m Ssenyonga made it clear that he was
not bound to the questionable decision of the Lee court.93
Although he could have considered Lee as persuasive because of
the lack of cases in this field in Canada, he did not. Instead, the
court distinguished Ssenyonga from Lee, holding that in Lee there
was insufficient evidence to show that the defendant was absolutely
aware that he was infected with HIV 94  The trial judge in
Ssenyonga was unwilling to embrace the view of consent in Lee
when he determined that the Lee court had acquitted the defen-
dant based on a lack of intent.95
87. Regina v. Ssenyonga, 81 C.C.C.3d 257, 259 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1993).
88. Id. at 261.
89. Regina v. Lee, 3 O.R.3d 726,728 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1991).
90. Id.
91. Ssenyonga, 81 C.C.C.3d at 264.
92. Regina v. Ssenyonga, 73 C.C.C.3d 216, 218-19 (Ont. Prov. Div. 1992).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 219.
95. Id.
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c. Knowledge Equals Intent
Ssenyonga established that the defendant must be aware of is
HIV status to be held responsible for the effects of the virus.
96
This suggests that the courts equate blameworthiness with engaging
in sex while being aware of the nsks.- By only crminalizmg
intentional, risky conduct, the courts are punishing a defendant for
a guilty mind, rather than focusing on the protection of the
populace.
If the Canadian courts' purpose is to find the defendant guilty
in order to stop the spread of AIDS, holding people crnunally
responsible for passing HIV, whether they are aware that they
carry the virus or not, would be a better deterrent. With all of the
warnings of AIDS in the commumty, an excuse of ignorance seems
contrary to public poliay. It may also discourage people who are
at risk from stepping forward to be tested because a positive test
would establish the requisite intent. The courts' refusal to impose
such a harsh policy against someone who was not aware of his HIV
status could reflect that punishment of the guilty-minded represents
the driving motivation of the courts, not general deterrence. On
the other hand, it could merely show the courts' unwillingness to
pnoritize deterrence above compassion for AIDS victims.
d. Adminitering a Noxious Thing
In the Ssenyonga preliminary inquiry, the Crown also charged
the defendant with administenng a noxious thing with the intent to
endanger life contrary to section 245 of the Crimunal Code.9
According to the Crown, semen containing HIV is "noxious." 8
The Crown further argued. that although there was no evidence
that the accused specifically intended to harm the complainants, the
defendant should have known that harm .to sexual partners could
result from unprotected sex, and that such recklessness is synony-
mous with intention.9
The court, however, disagreed with the Crown on the issue of
adminmistering a noxious thing. The court held that there was no
evidence that the accused could have foreseen the certainty, or
96. Ssenyonga, 81 C.C.C.3d at 259.
97. Regina v. Ssenyanga, 73 C.C.C.3d 216, 222 (Ont. Prov. Div. 1992).
98. Id.
99. Id.
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substantial certainty, of infecting the complainants with HIV by
having unprotected sex with them."W This decision established
the mens rea required for section 245 of the Canadian Criminal
Code.'
01
e. Common Nuisance
At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown also argued that the
transfer was a common nuisance, contrary to Criminal Code
Sedtion 180. The court distinguished its case from others m which
a common nuisance occurred because the defendant "did not offer
himself to the general public.""l The Crown successfully made
the common nuisance argument at the lower court level m
Thornton, where the defendant was convicted for common nuisance
to the public.10 3 The defendant appealed the holding, but the
Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal."° Hence,
several judges have agreed on the application of common nuisance
to the transfer of HIV; however, in Regina v. Mercer, a more
recent case to deal with this issue, the judge disregarded this
analysis.105
2. Regina v. Thornton
a. AIDS Infection as a Public Nuisance
Section 216 of the Crimnal Code provides that everyone who
undertakes to administer surgical or medical treatment to another
person is, except in cases of necessity, under a legal duty to use
reasonable knowledge, skill and care in the undertaking. 6 In
Regina v. Thornton, the defendant twice tested positive for HIV,
which he knew could lead to AIDS.107 Despite this knowledge,
the defendant donated blood to the Canadian Red Cross. The
Supreme Court of Canada found that the presence of HIV in
someone's blood indicates that the person is probably infected with
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Regina v. Ssenyonga, 73 C.C.C.3d 216, 224 (Ont. Prov. Div. 1992).
103. Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530, 540 (1993) (Can.).
104. Id.
105. Regina v. Mercer, 84 C.C.C.3d 41, 55 (Nfid. Ct. App. 1993).
106. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 216 (1985) (Can.), construed in, Regina v.
Thornton, 82 C.C.C3d 530,531 (1993) (Can.).
107. Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530, 531 (1993) (Can.).
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AIDS."° The Court pronounced that the dangers of AIDS, and
the ways it can be transferred, are well known so the defendant
must have known of the threat when he donated blood. Therefore,
he had the requisite intent for public nusance.' 9
The Supreme Court of Canada made many presumptions m
finding that the defendant was guilty of a public nuisance. First, it
presumed that the defendant was aware that donating blood to the
Red Cross would threaten the safety of the public. Second, the
court made an argument that no other Canadian court has
examined: that the defendant should have known that his donation
of blood was a threat to the public because his status as a gay man
made him a member of a high-nsk group."' Giving the defen-
dant this extra responsibility to the public because he was a gay
man was an unnecessary assumption because the defendant already
knew that he was HIV-positive, thereby making his so-called
"risky" status irrelevant. The Court suggested that a gay man owes
a higher standard of care to the public.
The Court appeared to establish an -argument that prosecutors
can use if a gay defendant transfers HIV without any real knowl-
edge of his HIV status. This hypothetical situation assigns criminal
intent to someone for being gay while. carrying on normal activities,
including activities, of good samantamsm like donating blood.
This case was significant in that the defendant knew that the
Canadian Red Cross collected blood for transfusions and that the
Red Cross would not knowingly accept donations of blood from
those who tested positive for HIV antibodies."' Authorities
charged the defendant with violating section 176(a) of the Cnrmnal
Code (now section 180) because he "intentionally withh[eld] the
information from the Canadian Red Cross Society."" 2
The defendant argued that he may not have made his status
clear, or filled out the questionnaire completely, but that this is not
enough to make him guilty of a criminal offense. The defendant
based Ins arguments on three main premises: (1) even if his
conduct was reprehensible, it does not amount to an offense known
to law; (2) his conduct did not endanger the lives or health of the
108. Id.
109. Id. at 540.
110. Id. at 531.
111. Id. at 532.
112. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 176(a) (1970) (Can.) (repealed 1985), construed
in, Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530, 532 (1993) (Can.).
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public; and (3) he did not have the necessary mens rea."3
Section 180(1) of the Crminal Code reads as follows:
"[e]veryone who commits a common nuisance and thereby (a)
endangers the lives, safety or health of the public, or (b) causes
physical injury to any person, is guilty of an indictable offence and
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding'two years. '14
Section 180(2) establishes that a person commits a common
nuisance if he or she does an unlawful act or. fails to discharge a
legal duty and thereby, "(a) endangers the lives, safety, health,
property or comfort of the public; or (b) obstructs the public in the
exercise or enjoyment. of any right that is common to all the
subjects of Her Majesty m Canada.""'
First, the defendant argued that even if some may find his
conduct irresponsible, or even reprehensible, this is not the type of
action that should be regulated or crimmalized by law." 6 Section
180(2) states that to cominut a common nuisance, an "unlawful act"
needs to occur.117 The Canadian Criminal Code does not outlaw
the donation of contaminated blood. The defendant interpreted
"unlawful act" to mean an act that has been specifically restricted
by legislation." 8  Therefore, the donation of blood could not
constitute a crime of common nuisance.
b. Judicial Recognition of the Lack of Statutory Law on Which
to Base a Decision
The defendant argued that the courts cannot crinnalize the
transfer of HIV without specifically prescribed legislation. 9
Although the court agreed that without legislation the transfer of
HIV cannot be unlawful conduct, it also held that specific legisla-
tion is unnecessary to find the defendant's conduct criminal." 0
Because this is a very recent legal issue, there is no history. of
crimmalizmg this conduct. Apparently, however, many Canadian
courts seek to take it upon themselves to protect the populace
113. Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530, 532 (1993) (Can.).
114. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 180 (1985) (Can.), quoted in, Regina v.
Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530, 532 (1993) (Can.).
115. Id.
116. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d at 532.
117. Id. at 533.
118. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 180 (1985) (Can.).
119. Regina v. Mercer, 84 C.C.C.3d 41, 49 (Nfld. Ct. App. 1993).
120. Id. at 42.
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from AIDS, rather than wait for the Parliament to pass protective
law.
There are no cases that have ruled on whether "unlawful
conduct" or "legal duty" as defined under section 180(2) must be
a duty imposed by statute, or whether it can be a duty m the
tradition of common law. Instead, the Mercer court looked to past
interpretations of duty and conduct in cases that involved criminal
negligence."' Section 219(1) states that everyone is criminally
negligent who is "(a) doing anything, or (b). omitting to do
anything that is his duty to do, or that shows wanton or reckless
disregard for the lives or safety of other persons."'" The
Thornton court stated that for the purposes of this section, "duty
means a duty imposed by law."' 23 The interpretations of this
negligence statute become the precedent for the interpretation of
common nuisance even though they are separate crimes and the
wording of their relevant statutes are quite -different.
The court has interpreted section 219, regarding criminal
negligence, to give the court discretion to crurunalize the spread of
HIV There would be no statutory basis for determining just what
is "unlawful" under the law.124 In 1981, a Canadian court held
that a parent is guilty of criminal negligence under section 219 if
the parent is under a legal duty at common law to take reasonable
steps to protect his or her child from violence at the hands of a
third person."5 Thus, a common law duty is a "duty umposed by
law" within the meaning of section 219
In Thornton, the court, ruled that even though the duties
involved in criminal negligence and common nuisance are not tie
same, they "have exactly the same meaning., 126 Therefore, a
court can enforce a legal duty without a statutory basis in cases
dealing with common nuisance under section 180. The court,
however, does not address why'the legal duty has exactly the same
meaning. Common nuisance does not have the tradition of
interpretation by the courts that negligence does, especially when
interpreting the donation of blood as a new form of common
nuisance.
121. Id. at 534-36.
122. Cnmmal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 219 (1985) (Can.).
123. Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530, 534 (1993) (Can.) (emphasis added).
124. It.
125. Regina v. Popen, 60 C.C.C.2d 232, 240 (Ont. Ct. App. 1981).
126. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d at 534.
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Once the court in Thornton defined common nuisance m
common law, it needed to determine whether there was a common
law duty that would prohibit a person from donating blood if that
person is HIV-positive. Without any precedent m criminal law, the
court again drew conclusiois from another area of law. The court
looked to tort law to find that common law m this area has
traditionally recognized the fundamental duty of a person to refrain
from conduct that could cause injury to another person.12 7 From
this theory, the court found that the defendant had a legal duty to
refrain from giving blood because it was reasonably foreseeable
that the donation could cause harm to anothdr person. 2
The court makes a large leap when it compares refraimng
from intentionally causing injury, to the act of donating blood.
First, the court cited two cases in which exposing someone to a
contagious disease constituted a common nuisance. 9 The court
was unable to cite these cases as authority, however, because
section 9(a) of the Canadian Criminal Code abolished this common
law offense.3 ° This passage of the updated Criminal Code
illustrates the Canadian Parliament's move away from stigmatizing
the sick with threats of incarceration.
Thornton also argued that his actions did not meet the basic
definition of a common nuisance because his blood donation did
not endanger the health or lives of the public. Thornton's
argument hinges on the fact that since 1985, the Canadian Red
Cross has used an advanced screening technique to eliminate
contaminated blood from the donation pool.131 Because of the
screening, Red Cross workers discovered that the defendant's
blood was contaminated, and disposed of it.32 Therefore, the
blood never really posed a threat to the public-the first require-
ment under section 180.
To reject the defendant's argument that his donation was not
a threat, the court drew a very broad interpretation of "threat" and
"public." The Crown proved that because the screening test is
127. Id. at 535.
128. Id. at 536.
129. Id. (citing Regina v. Vantandillo, 4 M. & S. 73 (1815) (Eng.); Regina v. Burnett,
4 M. & S. 727 (1815) (Eng.)).
130. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 9(a) (1985) (Can.), construed in, Regina v.
Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3td 530, 532 (1993) (Can.).
131. See Bragg, supra note 6, at A4.
132. Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530, 532 (1993) (Can.).
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"only" 99.3% accurate, 33 a threat still existed that the public
would use this blood. The court acknowledged that the risk to the
public here may be slight; however, when the gravity of potential
harm is "catastrophic," as it is here, this minimal danger satisfies
section 180."3 Moreover, the court defined the "public" as being
the health care workers who must handle and test the blood at the
Red Cross.35 The latter argument could open the door to
serious public policy problems if doctors, nurses, jamtors and
scientists could all accuse an HIV-mfected person if they get the
virus after coming in contact with his blood.
The defendant's final argument was that he did not have the
requisite mens rea of a common nuisance because he did not
believe that the blood would reach the public. The defendant
clanned that he thought that the Red Cross screening test was
100% effective so it would never use his blood. 36 Supposedly his
motive for donating the blood was that he believed he could get rid
of the virus by getting rid of his blood. The court rejected the
defendant's claim because there was evidence to show that this was
not his actual belief or motive. 37 The court did not address
whether this would be a legitimate argument if the defendant really
believed that the blood would not reach the public. Yet because
the court put such emphasis on the risk to the health care workers
Vwho handle the blood, the defendant probably would have needed
to prove that he did not foresee the threat to the handlers.
The court's attitude regarding those who spread HIV is
illustrated in the court's sentencing in. Thornton. The judge
categorized the defendant's" crime as among the worst possible
offenses, and "verg[ing] on the unspeakable.' 138 Rehabilitation
is obviously not a motive for long sentences in these cases because
the defendants often have short life expectancies. The judge in
Thornton stated that the purpose of the long jail sentence in this
case was to serve as a general deterrent for all people with HIV
and to express society's repudiation of the defendant's actions.
39
133. Id. at 537.
134. Id. at 538.
135. Id at 537.
136. Id. at 539.
137. Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530, 539 (1993) (Can.).
138. Id. at 540.
139. Id.
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3. Regina v. Mercer
Raymond Mercer argued that although he pleaded guilty to
cnmnal negligence, the Canadian appellate court should not have
increased his sentence because of the lack of precedent to
cnminalize his conduct in the first place."4 The court held,
however, that the crimmal, negligence provisions of the Criminal
Code are sufficiently broad to encompass the intentional transfer
of HIV 4' Although the court acknowledged the lack of prece-
dent in this area, 4 z it gave the defendant the maximum sentence
to deter such conduct and to solidify the use of criminal negligence
in future cases. 4 3
Using the common law interpretation of existing laws to
crmunalize the transfer of HIV may be more understandable in
cases where the defendant's intent is clear. The facts of Mercer
show that jailing the defendant appeared to be the only way to
protect the public from the defendant's virus. Canadian health
officials continuously tried to deter Mercer's risky conduct before
the court decided that it had to convict the defendant as a
criminal.' 44
Originally, a government health official contacted and advised
Mercer that he should assume that he was a carer of HIV
because a former partner of his was just diagnosed with the virus.
At this time, the health official told the defendant that he should
not engage in unprotected sexual intercourse because he could
easily transfer the deadly virus. Neither this warning, nor the
information that he did indeed test positive for HIV, affected the
defendant's behavior. 45
Immediately after the health official told the middle-aged
defendant not to engage in unprotected sex, the defendant began
a sexual relationship with a sixteen-year-old girl.146 He encour-
aged the girl to engage m unprotected sex with him without
warning her of his condition. The-defendant even assured the girl
that his health-was fine when she inquired as to whether they
140. Regina v. Mercer, 84 C.C.C.3d 41, 49 (Nfld. Ct. App. 1993).
141. Id at 50.
142. Id. at 54.
143. l at 57.
144. Id. at 58.
145. Regina v. Mercer, 84 C.C.C.3d 41, 44 (Nfld. Ct. App. 1993).
146. Id.
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should be using a condom. 47
Once the defendant had tested positive; the health official
called him back into her office. The official asked the defendant
for a list of his sex partners so that the health agency could warn
them of their chances of getting the virus and tell them to take
precautions so that they would not spread the virus any further.
The defendant gave the official a list but intentionally left off the
name of the minor.1'
When the health official discovered that the defendant was
intentionally threatening the life of tins girl, she had him arrested.
A court Immediately let him out on bail on the condition that he
would not engage in unprotected sex with the minor. The
defendant not only continued unprotected, sexual relations with the
minor, but eventually impregnated the girl thereby putting a baby's
health at risk as well.
149
a. Criminal Negligence
The appellate court sentencing the defendant held that
common nuisance was not the appropriate "crime" with wich to
label the defendant's conduct. 50 Instead, the court established
criminal negligence as the appropriate crime because it punishes
the risky conduct rather than the actual transfer of the virus.
Pumshing a defendant for spreading HIV would be a "gross
oversimplification" of the problem and would lead to a distortion
of the defendant's culpability.'
The court also would not compare a case dealing with AIDS
to past cases dealing with other communicable diseases. Tus view
suggests one of two things. It may suggest that Mercer was a
jurisdictional decision. Tus particular court was not willing to
adopt the attitude of other Canadian jurisdictions, which held that
courts have an unfettered role in protecting the public against
AIDS. On the other hand, Mercer may symbolize a general
backlash against using common law in this area. Judges throughout
Canada may be beginning to feel reluctant about using common
law to criminalize the disease except in the most malicious 'cases.
147. Id
148. Id. at 45.
149. Id. at 47.
150. Regina v. Mercer 84 C.C.C.3d 41, 55 (Nfld. Ct. App. 1993).
151. Id at 58.
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Either way, the conviction and sentencing depend on the currently
presiding judge, rather than case precedent or statutes regarding
the transfer of HIV
Section 221 of the Canadian Criminal Code, which states that
everyone who by crimunal negligence causes bodily harm to
another person is guilty of an indictable offense and liable to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, affirms the
appropriateness of the defendant's conviction.152 There are two
components to the offense: (1) an act of crmnal'negligence, which
section 219 defines as showing wanton orreckless disregard for the
lives and safety of other persons; and (2) causing bodily harm to
another by the offender's act or onussion.
The court only considers the defendant's conduct criminal if
it is serious enough to be considered criminal negligence because
the court will not criunalize the actual spreading of the virus. The
court considers a conviction for spreading HIV as analogous to a
conviction of a reckless driver for driving the car, rather than for
acting recklessly. It will only convict a defendant for spreading
HIV if reckless and wanton behavior infects another person with
the virus. 55
b. The Common Law Crime Used Reflects the Courts' Attitude.
Although the Mercer court's language seems to remove some
of the blame from a person for having the disease-by holding that
it is the conduct, not the transfer, which is criminal-its ruling
actually could have the opposite effect. The court states that it
does not want to follow the lead of other courts by crimnalizing
someone for spreading the HIV virus.156 Instead, it criminalizes
reckless conduct.'57 The Ssenyonga and Thornton courts, howev-
er, also could have used criminal negligence instead of common
nuisance to prosecute the defendants. Although convicting the
transferrer of HIV is more likely when the court labels the conduct
as common nuisance, this result is only because the label of
"common nuisance" is a less serious crime than "criminal negli-
gence."
152. Cnminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 221 (1985) (Can.).
153. Id.
154. Regina v. Mercer,'84 C.C.C.3d 41, 56 (Nfld. Ct. App. 1993).
155. Id at 62.
156. Id. at 58.
157. Id
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The sentences prescribed for certain crimes illustrate how
serious the legislature considers- the violation. After a surface
reading of Thornton, the court seemingly applied a strict view by
convicting the defendant for putting health care workers at risk,
and creating a theoretical (if not actual) risk to the public at large.
When examined more closely however, the facts show that the
maximum penalty for putting the public at risk, and thereby
causing a common nuisance, is only two years.158 On the other
hand, the maximum penalty for committing criminal negligence is
ten years. 59 The court in Mercer would not even consider the
sentence rendered m Thornton because the crime in Mercer was
significantly more severe.' 6°
If courts only convict defendants for criminal negligence in
cases factually similar to Mercer, where the defendant insists on
harming somewhat vulnerable parties, the move toward conviction
based on this crime appears quite justified,- On the other hand, if
the court did not consider common nuisance in Mercer because it
intended to claim that the spread of HIV is always, or usually,
caused by reckless or wanton behavior, the courts are taking a very
deliberate stance against the spread of the virus without any
legislation to back-it.
4. Regina v. Cuerrer
As the most recent Canadian case to address the intentional
transfer of HIV, Regina v. Cuerrner61 reflects the most probable
result for future cases. As in Ssenyonga and Mercer, the defendant
had unprotected sex with two women without telling them he was
HIV-positive."6 - A public health nurse told Cuerrier that he had
the HIV virus and instructed him.to wear a condom if he chose to
engage in sex.
Unlike in Mercer, however, the court acquitted the defendant
of all charges brought against him."a The British Columbia
Supreme Court would not convict Cuemer based on the aggravat-
ed assault charges brought by the Crown. The Court held that
"many will undoubtedly find the actions of the accused in this case
158. Ld. at 55.
159. Regina v. Mercer, 84 C.C.C.3d 41, 55 (Nfld. Ct. App. 1993).
160. Id.
161. Regina v. Cuermer, 26 W.C.B.2d 378, 378 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1995).
162. Id.
163. Id.
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repugnant and deserving of punishment," but it could not stietch
the offense of assault to tis situation.164
The Canadian public was so outraged by the decision that the
Parliament is finally, and seriously, considering legislation that
directly outlaws this type of conduct.165  Cuerner's attorney
stated that only the Parliament can resolve this problem. He
further suggested that Canada may have to follow the United
States' lead in this area of legislation.'
66
IV THE U.S. STRATEGY
Today, Canada is one of the only countries consistently to use
common law to convict potential transferrers of HIV67 The
Canadian courts, however, are not the only courts in the western
world to try to prosecute people this way. Initially, district
attorneys and state judges in the Umted States were wary of using
common law legal 9trategy to convict transferrers of attempted
murder.' 6' Many prosecutors womed about mfriging on the
privacy of the defendants. 69 Those state prosecutors who did try
to use common nuisance to convict defendants often found that
state judges were not willing to use traditional common law without
precedent of these laws being used against HIV-carners. 70
A. US. History of Illegal Transfer of HIV
In 1987, in Barlow v. Superior Court of San Diego County, a
California prosecutor attempted to convict a defendant for
attempted murder after he bit two San Diego police officers.171
The government suspected that the defendant knew he carried
HIV at the time of the assault. The California Court of Appeal,
however, would not accept that biting someone while being aware
of HIV status meant that there was an intent to commit murder or
great bodily injury."r The court looked to California statutory
164. Larry Still, Parliament Must Rule on HIV Garners, Lawyer Says, VANCOUVER SUN,
Mar. 9, 1995, at Bi.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Bragg, supra note 6, at A4.
168. Salamone, supra note 4, at Al.
169. Id.
170. Barlow v. Supenor Court, 236 Cal. Rptr. 134, 140-(Ct. App.), review denied and
opinion ordered depublished, May 26, 1987.
171. Id. at 135.
172. Id. at 140.
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law that dealt with transmittable diseases to make its determina-
tions.
173
The California court dealt with the transfer of HIV in three
distinct ways from the Canadian courts. First, the California Court
of Appeal would not consider elevatmg the crime because the
defendant was HIV-positive unless there was conclusive evidence
that the defendant actually infected the police officers.74 The
Canadian courts did not focus on the actual transfer of the virus.
Instead, Canadian judges focused on the risk the HIV-positive
defendant inflicts on the public by possibly exposing others. 75
Second, the California court held that the state must show that the
transferrer of the HIV virus must have intended to kill or cause
senous bodily harm.76 Lastly, the Califoria court was not
willing to read a public safety exception into state laws that guard
the privacy of HIV-positive individuals."7  Prosecutors argued
that the state legislature did snot intend to shield those who harbor
the HIV virus from criminal liability when they intentionally
expose others to the virus. Specifically, prosecutors argued that the
courts should not apply the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
drome Research Confidentiality Act, 7 which protects the confi-
dentiality of records maintained in AIDS research, in cases where
the defendant's HIV status makes hun or her more culpable. 179
The Califorma-Court of Appeal disagreed with this argument 8
The Court of Appeal held that taking away rights given to
HIV-camers by legislation would require the court to create an
exception to the legislation. The court did not take that strong a
role here because it did not find that the-possible infliction of the
virus through biting constituted an actual threat to public health
and safety.' The court based its decision on the fact that the
173. Id. at 138-39.
174. Id. at 138.
175. Regina v. Ssenyonga, 81 C.C.C.3d 257, 265 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1993); Regina v.
Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530, 540 (1993) (Can.); Regina v. Mercer, 84 C.C.C.3d 41, 56-57
(Nfld. Ct. App. 1993).
176. Barlow v. Superior Court, 236 Cal. Rptr. 134, 138 (Ct. App.), review dented and
opinion ordered depublished, May 26, 1987.
177. Id. at 140.
178. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.20-.60 (West 1985).
179. Barlow, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
180. Id. at 138.
181. Barlow v. Supenor Court, 236 Cal. Rptr. 134, 138 (Ct. App.), review denied and
opinion ordered depublished, May 26, 1987.
426 [Vol. 18:401
1996] AIDS Infects the Canadian Legal Community
comprehensive statutory scheme set out in the Health and Safety
Code does not include provisions characterizing AIDS victims as
threats to public health and safety.1  The court was unwilling to
play the role of state health official at the expense of the rights of
AIDS victims. The court wrote: "while some cultures require a
leper to ring a bell to warn the passerby, our Legislature has not
so stigmatized the victims of AIDS. Our skies are not black with
smoke from cities burned to prevent the spread of plague."1
B. Drafting a Canadian Statute Based on U.S. State Legislation.
Today, state courts in the Umted States do not have to go
through the elaborate analysis used in Barlow to convict a
defendant. Since 1987, twenty-four states have enacted legislation
that explicitly outlaws an intentional transfer of HIV 4 State
courts now freely, and consistently, convict defendants based on
these statutes.'8 Canada could look to these state laws as
models for its own proposed legislation.
Many of these statutes reflect the developing policies of the
Canadian courts. In outlawing the transfer of HIV, several U.S.
state statutes codify the same views that the Canadian courts
embrace, namely- (1) the defendant must know he is HIV-
positive;" 6 (2) the defendant's conduct exposed an individual to
HIV, irrespective of whether he actually transferred the virus;
and (3) an affirmative defense is available in cases where the
individual put at risk consented to the nsy conduct, with knowl-
edge of the defendant's HIV status.188
It may appear that Canadian courts are more lement toward
defendants than the three statutory standards above. For example,
182. Id. at 140.
183. Id.
184. Blackwell, supra note 4, at BI; Milling, supra note 12, at C1.
185. See, e.g., Illinois v. Dempsey, 242 IlL. App. 3d 568 (1993); Smallwood v. Maryland,
106 Md. App. 1. (1995); Ridenour v. Indiana, 639 N.E.2d 288 (1994); New Jersey v. Smith,
262 N.J. Super. 487 (1993); Louisiana v. Gamberella, 633 So. 2d 595 (1993).
186. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.0877 (West 1995); ILL.
REV STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-109 (1995); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-29-145 (Law. Co-op. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie 1994).
187. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.0877 (West 1995); ILL-
REV STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-109 (1995); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-29-145 (Law. Co-op. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michte 1994).
188. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.0877 (West 1995); ILL. REV STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2
(1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-109 (1995).
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in Ssenyonga and Cuerrier, the court would not convict a defendant
because the partner consented to the risky conduct, even though
the partner had no knowledge that the defendant carried H-IIV 8 9
These Canadian decisions, however, hinge on the courts' unwilling-
ness to stretch traditional common law to crimmalize this behavior,
rather than a desire to label the defendants as not culpable."l
Even the judges who have acquitted defendants of transferring the
virus describe the defendant's behavior as reprehensible."'
V PROBLEMS WITH CODIFIED CRIMINALIZATION
Of course, even if Canada alleviates the problem of inconsis-
tency in the application of AIDS law, other reasons still exist to
avoid cnrminalizing the transfer of the virus. The crimmalization of
AIDS may protect the health of the public, but it will also lead to
restrictions on the rights of HIV-camers and potential carriers.
AIDS activists, and many U.S. prosecutors, object to crnmmalizing
the spread of HIV-whether or not there exists a statute on point.
Those against crumnalization argue that criminal charges will not
stop a person who already faces a death sentence,192 so the threat
of incarceration represents at most a minimal deterrent. Further,
incarceration would not stop the spread of the virus because an
obvious threat still exists to other prison inmates.
Crunmnalizing the transfer of HIV also leads to questions
regarding the justice system's duty to protect the public. Howard
De Nike, a former San Francisco attorney who defended his client
before a court-martial on charges of exposing the virus to the
military, argues that western cultures only cnminalize the spread of
HIV, and other sexually transmitted diseases, because of our
puritamcal views about sex.' 3 He points out that a person with
a commumcable respiratory disease would not be convicted for
exposing others to the disease if he or she sneezed m someone's
189. Regina v. Ssenyonga, 81 C.C.C.3d 257, 266 (Ont. Gen. Div.. 1993); Regina v.
Cuerner, 26 W.C.B.2d 378, 378 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1995).
190. Regina v. Ssenyonga, 81 C.C.C.3d 257, 266 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1993); Regina v.
Cuerner, 26 W.C.B.2d 378, 378 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1995).
191. Regina v. Mercer, 84 C.C.C.3d 41, 64 (Nfld. Ct. App. 1993); Regina v. Ssenyonga,
81 C.C.C.3d .257, 266 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1993); Regina v. Cuerner, 26 W.C.B.2d 378, 378
(B.C. Sup. Ct. 1995); Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C.3d 530, 540 (1993) (Can.).
192. Salanone, supra note 4, at Ai.
193. McKee, supra note 18, at 2.
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face.'94 There seems to be an underlying belief that those who
engage in sexual relationships are inherently more culpable.
Many of these cases deal with two adults who consent to
sexual intercourse. AIDS activists claim that often the person who
spreads the disease is in demal about his or her HIV status. 9
Whether the carrier's motive is malicious or not, a question of dual
responsibility often exists.' 96
VI. CONCLUSION
The similarity between AIDS legal policy in Canada and the
United States rests m the tension between protection of society and
protection of the LILV carer's civil rights. Health officials and
AIDS rights activists pressure the Canadian Parliament not to
enact laws that make inherently "human" acts criminal because
they are committed by HIV-camers. Iromcally, this sympathy for
HIV-camers has given individual prosecutors and judges limitless
power over the fates of those who transfer the virus. The
Canadian Parliament has not passed laws regarding the transfer of
HIV, so the Canadian courts, have instead relied on common law
and broad criminal statutes to punish those who "threaten" society
with their illness.
Although some defendants are truly "criminal" in their
intentional transfer of the virus, others are not. A judge may
consider the circumstances surrounding the transfer when it comes
to sentencing, but established n mum sentences for whatever
crime is applied to the transfer will regulate this discretion.1 9 On
the other hand, some judges are unwilling to convict those who are
truly culpable because of the lack of applicable statutory law.'98
Without statutes that address the special circumstances of AIDS,
it is difficult to imagme a legal process that reflects the interests of
the HIV-carrier or society.
The U.S. legislative bodies and courts have a history of the
same tension between the health of society and the rights of the
194. Id.
195. Salamone, supra note 4, at Al.
196. Terrah Keener, a representative of AIDS Vancouver, declares that it is the public's
own responsibility to protect itself, not the judicial system's responsibility. Spreading AIDS
Criminal, supra note 4, at B16.
197. Regina v. Thornton, 82 C.C.C3d 530, 540 (1993) (Can.).
198. Regina v. Cuerrier, 26 W.C.B.2d 378, 378 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1995); Regina v.
Ssenyonga 81 C.C.C.3d 257, 266 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1993).
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individual. Originally, there were no state statutes regarding the
transfer of HIV Similar to their Canadian counterparts, ambitious
prosecutors crafted cases around common law.199 In the United
States, however, the inconsistency in enforcement of the transfer
of the virus made this area too controversial for many
prosecutors.200 Instead, most prosecutors have waited for the
public to pressure the legislature to enact laws regarding the spread
of HIV This pressure has resulted in twenty-four U.S. states
enacting statutes that specifically address these controversial
crimes.
201
People who transfer HIV in Canada, or in U.S. states without
AIDS legislation, may find themselves in a very difficult situation.
How can someone change his behavior, or defend himself in court,
when the elements of the "crime" depend on which judge or
prosecutor takes the case9 The inconsistency of the decisions of
the Canadian courts regarding the transfer of HIV illustrates the
possible injustice that can occur when courts punish defendants
with minmal precedent and in the absence of statutes.
The Canadian Parliament should adopt legislation similar to
that enacted in the United States. Many of these U.S. state
statutes codify the positions of Canadian courts and create a
consistent body of law for all Canadian courts to follow. 2 It
appears that both the Canadian courts and the public have
prioritized hinrfdermg the spread of HIV above protecting the rights
of already-infected citizens. To protect HIV-lnfected citizens from
having their civil rights trampled altogether, these citizens must
have access to a fair judicial process that relies on universally
applicable statutory law.
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